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Now We Know About Pinochet, but 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
By Gerald Robert Pace 
 
 
 
 
 
A review of Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 
(Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights), 1999. 296pp. 
 
 
General Augusto Pinochet, who served as military and civil leader of Chile from 1973 until 1990, 
forged perhaps one of the most authoritarian regimes ever to govern in the Western Hemisphere. 
Spearheading the violent coup d’état that ousted socialist President Salvador Allende, Pinochet not 
only achieved power, but also created a personalistic dictatorship bolstered by a military run 
governmental bureaucracy to secure his rule. And indeed, this combination perpetuated Pinochet’s 
seventeen-year tenure. 
In the years following the coup, Chile’s military, under orders from Pinochet, embarked on a 
violent purging of the nation’s remaining leftist movements as well as indiscriminately targeting 
those deemed as sympathizers to the former Allende regime. During this period thousands of 
dissidents feel under the category of what would become known as the “disappeared.” Much as the 
name suggests, the disappeared were those individuals targeted by the Pinochet regime, abducted, 
often held for indefinite periods without charges and then silently murdered, either buried in 
unmarked graves or their bodies dumped into nearby waterways to be forever lost or to float down 
the river as a lasting, bloated sign of what will come to those who challenge his regime. 
Yet, just as other authoritarian regimes across the globe had done, the Pinochet regime came to 
end in 1990 with a slow transition towards democratic rule. But this transition did not begin with 
death of Pinochet, indeed, not even his total abdication of power. Under the 1980 Constitution, 
Pinochet is allowed to fulfill the office of senator for life. With this office, Pinochet is granted 
“parliamentary” immunity for any crimes that he or his regime committed while in office. In 
essence, by a constitution of his own design Pinochet would forever be beyond the grasp of justice. 
And here lies the dilemma. 
In 1990, Pinochet’s successor President Patricio Aylwin publicly declared a National 
Commission for Truth and Reconciliation to help account for the atrocities committed under the 
Pinochet era. The findings of this commission, as well as other human rights organizations become 
the subject of a new work by Mark Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. In his 
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work, Ensalaco presents a historical narrative of the actions of the Pinochet regime as well as efforts 
made by human rights organizations to counter, and hold them accountable for, these actions. This 
fascinating account paints a vivid picture of the conditions that made Chile susceptible to a military 
coup and the years of tyranny that followed, as well as the chain of command that places Pinochet 
personally responsible for many of the crimes committed under his rule. 
As a glimpse into the harrowing conditions of life under Pinochet, Ensalaco’s account is not an 
ideologically biased work singularly motivated by a desire to demonize Pinochet. Rather, it is an 
evenhanded account of a regime born and maintained through violence, and a stunning description 
of the terrifying long-term impact of human rights abuses not only on those who suffer the injustice 
but family members who must suffer the legacy of never knowing what happened to their loved 
ones. This is perhaps the greatest asset of Ensalaco’s work, to offer an account of the full impact of 
the disappeared on the people of Chile. As he puts it, “A disappearance does not end with the 
murder of the victim and the concealment of his or her body. A disappearance has a destructive 
legacy; it is a continuing crime.” 
So now that we know what happened under the Pinochet regime, how could the international 
community use this knowledge and can we ever hold Pinochet accountable for the crimes he has 
committed? The shrewd move on the part of Pinochet to secure for himself parliamentary immunity 
within Chilean law seems an impenetrable roadblock to ever holding him accountable for his crimes. 
But this legal technicality does not seem wholly satisfying as a justification for keeping him above 
the law—and the Chilean Supreme Court finally lifted Pinochet’s immunity in 2000. As Ensalaco 
points out “The failure to prosecute the guilty because of debilitating political and legal constraints 
has disturbing implications in terms of the rule of law, and the anguish of the families of the 
‘disappeared’ constitutes a perpetual injustice.” 
But the Pinochet case presents a Pandora’s box when it comes to international law. In order to 
justify their actions, at least in the early stages after the coup, the Pinochet regime argued that they 
were in a state of civil war. While largely fabricated, the pretense of a civil war gave the actions of 
the Chilean military a veil of legitimacy, at least for a while. Soon, however, their actions, whether 
committed under the auspices of war or not, violated the Geneva Convention and were, 
undoubtedly war crimes. But still, these were crimes committed by a state on the people of that 
state, thus bringing forth the sticky issue of state sovereignty and to what degree state action, 
particularly those actions towards its own population, can be considered legitimate. 
This is the conundrum faced by the international community: how do we hold Pinochet 
responsible for the crimes he may have committed if the Chilean courts refuse to hold him 
accountable? And, if we were to hold him responsible, what would be the precedent set by such 
action and what would that mean for future cases in international criminal law? Indeed, this cuts at 
the heart of the issue: is there such a thing as international criminal law? Historically, international 
law was limited to the actions of states. Should we now acknowledge that states act in ways that their 
leaders dictate? Must the leaders of states who issue orders, despite positions of power, be held 
accountable for crimes committed by their orders, even if done in the name of state interests? 
Perhaps the difficulty of these questions would be lessened if we already had a functioning 
international criminal court. The Rome Statute, the founding charter for the International Criminal 
Court (the Court) created an institution that, once functioning, will be able to address criminal 
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actions undertaken by individuals, no matter what their office may be, in any of the Court’s four 
areas of automatic jurisdiction: war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of 
aggression. Based on this treaty, if the Chilean courts were unwilling or unable to prosecute Pinochet 
(a possible example being his political immunity) then the Court would be able to initiate a trial of its 
own. 
Obviously the Pinochet case is moot under the Court, but it could prosecute future dictators and 
their human rights violations based on that case. The Court would have tremendous advantages over 
national courts in that it only would have jurisdiction over codified international law, which in many 
ways will de-politicize the adjudication process and allow for an unprecedented degree of 
transparency within the deliberations. However, the reality of the Court may, unfortunately, be quite 
different. Although the Clinton administration signed the Rome Treaty (one of its last acts), the 
likelihood of Senate approval and formal ratification seems highly improbable. Without the support 
of the United States, the Court may lack the political clout needed, not to mention the financial 
resources, to adequately investigate and prosecute suspected violators. 
But, there is a larger issue of state sovereignty here that is exacerbated by the unwillingness of 
the US to join the Court and the justifications for their decision. Sovereignty is a locus of ideas 
pertaining to the rights of states. As such, conceptions of state sovereignty will evolve over time, and 
what is considered an aspect of state sovereignty at one juncture in history may not be viewed so at 
another. The key to understanding this is that sovereignty is a conception based on a general 
consensus of the actors in the international system. The unwillingness of the United States, as well as 
others, to participate in the Court indicates a lack of consensus towards the priority of human rights 
above and beyond a state’s right towards unimpeded sovereignty. 
Unfortunately, even if the United States were in support of the Court, none of this would have 
any bearing on Pinochet or the crimes he committed some twenty-five years ago. Crimes prior to the 
signing of the Rome Treaty are not within the Court’s jurisdiction. However, a clear international 
consensus that such crimes were and are prosecutable, and that it is appropriate to bring to justice 
individuals no matter rank or title, would create an climate where Pinochet could be held 
accountable for his crimes and that perhaps an international tribunal should be called for such an 
action. Ensalaco has brought the truth behind the atrocities of the Pinochet regime before us; it is 
now time for us to decide if we will now bring Pinochet to justice. 
 
Gerald Robert Pace is a doctoral student in International Politics, Political Theory, and Human Rights at the 
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver. 
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